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The Power Allocation Game on A Network: Balanced Equilibrium
Yuke Li, and A. Stephen Morse
Abstract—This paper studies a special kind of equilibrium
termed as “balanced equilibrium” which arises in the power
allocation game defined in [15]. In equilibrium, each country
in antagonism has to use all of its own power to counteract
received threats, and the “threats” made to each adversary
just balance out the threats received from that adversary. This
paper establishes conditions on different types of networked
international environments in order for this equilibrium to exist.
The paper also links the existence of this type of equilibrium on
structurally balanced graphs to the Hall’s Maximum Matching
problem and the Max Flow problem.
Index Terms—power allocation, balancing, threat, maximum
matching, max flow
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper [15], a power allocation game on net-
works is developed to study countries’ strategic behaviors for
allocating resources among one another in an international
environment. In playing the game, each country allocates its
total power among its friends and foes in order to ensure the
survival of its friends and itself while opposing the survival
of its foes.
This paper investigates the existence of a ‘balanced equi-
librium’ in a power allocation game. The motivation for
this comes from both the simple technical structure of the
equilibrium of interest and its real world implications. A
condition for a balanced equilibrium to exist in the power
allocation game is similar in form to the condition for
existence of an equilibrium as expressed in Hall’s maximum
matching theorem (see [6]–[8], [19]).
This paper belongs to a vast literature on agents’ inter-
actions on signed graphs. This literature has its roots in the
study of consensus in distributed, multi-agent systems, where
the earliest work include [12], [22], [26]. The literature has
recently been broadened to address scenarios where antago-
nistic interactions also exist; correspondingly, signed graphs
become a focus in the analysis (i.e., a signed graph is a graph
where each edge has a positive sign denoting a cooperative
relation or a negative sign denoting a conflictual relation)
[1]–[3], [17], [18], [21], [23]–[25], [27]. A particular type
of signed graph called a ‘structurally balanced graph’ [5])
plays a key role in the ‘modulus consensus’ problem (e.g.,
[2], [27]).
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In contrast with the consensus problem on signed graphs,
an optimization framework is necessarily needed for studying
agents’ strategic interactions on signed graphs. Moreover,
a game-theoretic framework can naturally be formulated to
capture the noncooperative and cooperative scenarios innate
to those interactions. It appears that [13], [15], [16] and this
paper are the first set of papers on the topic of ‘games on
signed graphs’; a difference between the power allocation
game in the latter three papers and [13] is that each agent
has a total resource constraint in the power allocation game.
It should also be noted that “games on signed graphs” means
games where each agent’s strategy does not involve changing
their network of relations. Games where agents’ strategies
do involve changing networks are usually referred to as
‘network formation games’ [10]; network formation games
on countries’ relation dynamics include [?], [11] and [14].
In particular, [?] studies what kinds of networks in Nash
equilibrium are structurally balanced).
The organization of this paper is as follows. First, in
Section II the power allocation game is briefly summarized.
Second, in Section III the notion of a balanced equilib-
rium will be defined and its real world implications will
be discussed. Third, the existence of such an equilibrium
will be investigated in power allocation games for different
networked environments. In particular, a connection will be
drawn between balanced equilibria and the Hall Maximum
Matching problem and the Max Flow problem in combina-
torial optimization.
II. THE POWER ALLOCATION GAME
A. Formulation
By the power allocation game is meant a distributed
resource allocation game between n countries with labels in
n = {1, 2, . . . , n} [15]. The game is formulated on a simple,
undirected, signed graph E = {V , E} called “an environment
graph” [16] whose n vertices correspond to the countries and
whosem edges represent relationships between countries. An
edge between distinct vertices i and j, denoted by (i, j), is
labeled with a plus sign if countries i and j are friends and
with a minus sign if countries i and j are adversaries. Let the
set of all friendly pairs be RF and the set of all adversarial
pairs be RA. For each i ∈ n, Fi and Ai denote the sets of
labels of country i’s friends and adversaries respectively; it
is assumed that i ∈ Fi and that Fi and Ai are disjoint sets.
Each country i possesses a nonnegative quantity pi called
the total power of country i. An allocation of this power,
called a strategy, is a nonnegative 1×n row vector ui whose
jth component uij is that part of pi which country i allocates
under the strategy to either support country j if j ∈ Fi or
to the demise of country j if j ∈ Ai; accordingly uij = 0
if j 6∈ Fi ∪ Ai and ui1 + ui2 + · · · + uin = pi. The goal
of the game is for each country to choose a strategy which
contributes to the demise of all of its adversaries and to the
support of all of its friends.
Each set of country strategies {ui, i ∈ n} determines an
n×n matrix U whose ith row is ui. Thus U =
[
uij
]
n×n
is
a nonnegative matrix such that, for each i ∈ n, ui1 + ui2 +
· · ·+uin = pi. Any such matrix is called a power allocation
matrix and U is the set of all n× n strategy matrices.
B. Multi-front Pursuit of Survival
Just how each country allocates its power in a power
allocation game [15], [16] is consistent with the fundamental
assumptions about countries’ behaviors in classical interna-
tional relations theory [?]. In particular, each power alloca-
tion matrix U determines for each i ∈ n, the total support
σi(U) of country i and the total threat τi(U) against country
i. Here σi : U → IR and τi : U → IR are non-negative
valued maps defined by U 7−→
∑
j∈Fi
uji +
∑
j∈Ai
uij
and U 7−→
∑
j∈Ai
uji respectively. Thus country i’s total
support is the sum of the amounts of power each of country
i’s friends allocate to its support plus the sum of the amounts
of power country i allocates to the destruction of all of its
adversaries. Country i’s total threat, on the other hand, is
the sum of the amounts of power country i’s adversaries
allocate to its destruction. These allocations in turn determine
country i’s state xi(U) which may be safe, precarious, or
unsafe depending on the relative values of σi(U) and τi(U).
In particular, xi(U) = safe if σi(U) > τi(U), xi(U) =
precarious if σi(U) = τi(U), or xi(U) = unsafe if σi(U) <
τi(U).
In playing the power allocation game, each country selects
its own strategy in accordance with certain weak and/or
strong preferences. A sufficient set of conditions for country
i to weakly prefer power allocation matrix V ∈ U over power
allocation matrix U ∈ U are as follows
1) For all j ∈ Fi either xj(V ) ∈ {safe, precarious}, or
xj(U) ∈ {unsafe}, or both.
2) For all j ∈ Ai either xj(V ) ∈ {unsafe, precarious},
or xj(U) ∈ {safe}, or both.
Weak preference by country i of V over U is denoted by
U  V . Meanwhile, a sufficient condition for country i to
be indifferent to the choice between V and U is that xi(U) =
xj(V ) for all j ∈ Fi∪Ai. This is denoted by V ∼ U . Finally,
a sufficient condition for country i to strongly prefer V over
U is that xi(V ) be a safe or precarious state and xi(U) be
an unsafe state. Strong preference by country i of V over U
is denoted by U ≺ V .
The Nash equilibrium concept is naturally employed in
the power allocation game to make predictions. Let country
i’s deviation from the power allocation matrix U be a
nonnegative-valued 1 × n row vector di such that ui + di
is a valid strategy that satisfies the total power constraint
for country i. The deviation set Di(U) is the set of all
possible deviations of country i’s power from the power
allocation matrix U . In the context of the power allocation
game, a power allocation matrix U is a pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium if no one deviation in strategy by any single
country i is ‘profitable’ for country i. In other words
U + eidi  U, for all di ∈ Di(U),
where ei is the ith unit n-vector.
Denote by U∗ the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Call U ∈ U∗ equilibrium equivalent to V ∈ U∗ if and only if
x(U) = x(V ). Clearly the relation ‘equilibrium equivalence’
is the equivalence kernel of the restriction of x to U∗ and thus
is an equivalence relation on U∗. Let [U ]∗ be the equilibrium
equivalence class of U ∈ U∗. Obviously, the total number
of equilibrium equivalence classes is at most 3n, which in
turn is the cardinality of the co-domain of x.
III. BALANCED EQUILIBRIUM
The aim of this section is to explain what is meant by a
balanced equilibrium. We begin with a motivating example.
Example 1: Consider an environment consisting of n = 3
countries whose total powers are p1 = 8, p2 = 6 and
p3 = 4. Assume that all three are adversaries of each other
in which case E is a complete graph with − assigned to
all three edges. There are at least four possible equilibrium
equivalence classes [Ui]∗, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} where
U1 =

2 4 22 0 4
0 4 0

 , U2 =

0 4 45 0 1
4 0 0

 , U3 =

0 6 26 0 0
3 1 0

 ,
and
U4 =

0 5 35 0 1
3 1 0


It can be shown that for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, any allocation of
power determined by any power allocation matrix in [Ui]∗,
results in the survival of only country i [16]. It can also be
shown that any allocation of power determined by any power
allocation matrix in [U4]∗, causes all three countries to be in
a precarious state. All power allocation matrices within this
class are symmetric and each one leaves all three countries
without any remaining power. These observations motivate
the following definition.
A power allocation matrix U of a power allocation game
is a balanced equilibrium if
1) ∀i ∈ n such that Ai is the empty set, uii = pi.
2) ∀i ∈ n such that Ai is nonempty, uii = 0 and∑
j∈Ai
uij = pi
3) ∀(i, j) ∈ RA, uij = uji where RA is the set of all
pairs (i, j) for which countries i and j are adversaries.
It is easy to see that these conditions imply that U will be
a balanced equilibrium if and only if for some permutation
P , U = PDP ′ where prime denotes transpose, D =block
diagonal {D1, D2}, D1 is a symmetric matrix with zero
diagonals, and D2 is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal
entries are the total powers of those countries which have
no adversaries. Thus in a balanced equilibrium, each country
with no adversaries allocates all of its power to itself while
each country with adversaries allocates all of its power exclu-
sively to the demise of its adversaries. Each power allocation
matrix within the equilibrium class [U4]∗ in Example 1 is a
balanced equilibrium. We have the following result.
Theorem 1: A balanced equilibrium is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1: In a balanced equilibrium U∗, no
country will have incentives to deviate.
1) ∀i ∈ n s.t. Ai 6= ∅, xi(U∗) = precarious; ∀j ∈ Ai,
xj(U
∗) = precarious. Therefore, country i has no
power to deviate.
2) ∀i ∈ n s.t. Ai = ∅, xi(U∗) = safe; ∀j ∈ Fi,
xj(U
∗) = safe or precarious or Fi = ∅. Therefore, in
any of the cases, country i has no incentives to deviate
because it has already attained the best power alloca-
tion outcome, as implied by the sufficient conditions
on the preference relations on the power allocation
matrices.
A balanced equilibrium’s realistic implication lies in first
illustrating a possible situation multiple parties in conflicts
may arrive at. None has enough power preponderance over
others to avoid the precarious state as predicted in the
equilibrium. No one will deviate from this equilibrium unless
there is a change to their power condition.
Second, it provides the theoretical basis for a particular
kind of military strategy; the Chinese proverb for the military
strategy is “yu bang xiang zheng, yu weng de li”, and the
English counterpart is “when shepherds quarrel, the wolf has
a winning game ”. In other words, by the strategy, the third
party can take advantage of others’ internal conflicts and
thereby achieve its own goals. For example, Catherine the
Great hoped to minimize the potential threats to her empire
from Austria and Prussia by entangling these two countries in
conflicts with France – as she told her secretary in November
1791, “I am racking my brains in order to push the courts
of Vienna and Berlin into French affairs...there are reasons i
cannot talk about; I want to get them involved in that business
to have my hands free. I have much unfinished business, and
it’s necessary for them to be kept busy and out of my way”.
[20] It should be noted that the unique survivor respectively
corresponding to equilibrium classes [U1]∗, [U2]∗, and [U3]∗
in Example 1 survives exactly because the other two coun-
tries have exhausted themselves in their conflict.
It is possible to develop a test for deciding whether or not a
given power allocation game has a balanced equilibrium. To-
wards this end, note first that in the case when no country has
any adversaries {i.e., when all of the Ai are empty sets}, the
diagonal matrix U = diagonal {p1, p2, . . . , pn} is a balanced
equilibrium and it is the only one; this is a consequence of
condition 1 in the definition of a balanced equilibrium. Now
suppose that there is at least one adversarial relationship
between two countries in which case there are na < n
countries with adversaries and q > 0 adversary pairs in RA.
These relationships determine a q-edge subgraph A of the
unsigned version of the environment graph E whose na ≤ n
vertices correspond to the na countries with adversaries.
Let j1, j2, . . . , jna denote the labels in E of the countries
which have adversaries and write pi for the na-vector pi =
column {pi1 , pi2 , . . . , pina}. Let (i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . (iq, jq)
be an ordering of the edges of A, write C = [cik]na×q for the
incidence matrix of A which is consistent with this ordering,
and let β denote the map β : U → IRq for which U 7−→
column {ui1j1 , ui2j2 , . . . , uiqjq}. Let U0 denote the subset of
U consisting of all power allocation matrices U for which
uii = pi for all countries i which have no adversaries. The
definition of a balanced equilibrium implies that any given
balanced equilibrium U ∈ U must be in U0 and that any
such U determines a nonnegative vector vU = β(U) which
satisfies CvU = pi. Conversely any nonnegative vector v sat-
isfying Cv = pi uniquely determines a balanced equilibrium
U ∈ U0 for which uikjk = vk = ujkik , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q}.
We are led to the following conclusion.
Proposition 1: Suppose RA is nonempty and that there
are na > 1 countries with adversaries. Let U0, C, β, and pi
be as defined above and write Vbal for the set of nonnegative
na-vectors v such that pi = Cv. Then U is a balanced
equilibrium in U if and only if U ∈ U0 and β(U) ∈ Vbal.
Deciding whether or not a given matrix U ∈ U is a bal-
anced equilibrium assuming RA is nonempty thus amounts
to checking to see whether or not U ∈ U0 and β(U) ∈ Vbal.
Conversely, any vector v ∈ Vbal uniquely determines a
balanced equilibrium in U0. The problem of finding a vector
v ∈ Vbal can easily be set up as a linear programming
programming problem. It is clear that all one needs to do
is to minimize the sum of the q slack variables comprising
the q-vector z subject to the constraints that Cv + z = pi,
z ≥ 0 and v ≥ 0. Clearly deciding whether or not a given
power allocation game has a balanced equilibrium can be
accomplished using, for example, the simplex algorithm to
determine whether or not the linear programming problem
just posed has a solution.
Based on the specific technical structure of balanced equi-
librium, the following “construction lemma” is presented.
Applying it repeatedly, one can start from a simple game that
has a balanced equilibrium, and construct a far more complex
game while retaining the existence of balanced equilibrium.
Lemma 1: (Constructing allocations) Take any i, j ∈ n
of a power allocation game where a balanced equilibrium
exists such that j ∈ Ai, and let p¯ = p + δ(ei + ej), where
δ is a positive real number. Then the new game also has a
balanced equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose U is a balanced equilibrium of the
original power allocation game. Take (i, j) ∈ RA, and let
U¯ = U + δ(eie
⊤
j + eje
⊤
i ). U¯ is a valid power allocation
matrix of the new game.
Obviously, U¯ is symmetric. ∀i s.t. Ai 6= ∅, u¯ii = 0. No
one will deviate, and therefore, it is a balanced equilibrium
of the new game.
Lemma 1 implies that the two games are only different
by the power of two countries i and j which have an
adversary relation. Lemma 2 constructs another new node
(and its relation) for the original game and a new balanced
equilibrium for the new game.
Lemma 2: (Constructing nodes and allocations) Con-
struct a node n+1 /∈ n of a power allocation game where a
balanced equilibrium exists. Let pn+1 = 0, (i, n+ 1) ∈ RA
for one country i ∈ n. Then the game after incorporating
vn+1 also has a balanced equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose U is a balanced equilibrium of the orig-
inal game. Then U¯ =
[
U 0
0 0
]
is the balanced equilibrium
of the new game.
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The above figure illustrates the process of applying
Lemma 2 to construct a balanced equilibrium for a four-
player game:
1) Add a country with zero power, country 4, to the
original game.
2) Add 2 to both p3 and p4 and obtain the new game.
3) Construct the balanced equilibriums before and after
the change.
A necessary power condition for countries is now stated
for the existence of balanced equilibrium in environments of
any relation configuration. The intuition is that if there exists
a country whose power does not satisfy the below condition,
this country will never exhaust its power by allocating to
its adversaries. Theorem 3 (whose proof requires Theorem
2) shows that this is actually the necessary and sufficient
condition for countries’ power for a balanced equilibrium to
exist in a PAG where the adversary pairs make up a complete
graph.
Theorem 2: (Necessary power condition) In a power al-
location game, the necessary condition for the existence
of a balanced equilibrium is that ∀i ∈ n s.t. Ai 6= ∅,∑
j∈Ai
pj ≥ pi.
Proof: By the definition of balanced equilibrium, ∀i ∈
n s.t. Ai 6= ∅, uii = 0 and uji = uij . And by the power
constraint, ∀j ∈ Ai, uji ≤ pj .
Therefore, it is shown that∑
j∈Ai
pj ≥
∑
j∈Ai
uji =
∑
j∈Ai
uij =
∑
j∈Ai
uij + uii = pi
Lemma 3: (Unique Balanced Equilibrium with Three-
Player Complete adversary Graph) In a power allocation
game, there are three countries with adversary relations. If
the adversary relations make up a complete graph and if the
total power condition in theorem 2 holds for them, a unique
balanced equilibrium exists.
Proof: A unique balanced equilibrium, U , can be
constructed. For the three countries country 1, country 2
and country 3 making up a complete graph, their mutual
allocations and reserved power are
• [u11 u12 u13] = [0
p1 + p2 − p3
2
p1 + p3 − p2
2
]
• [u21 u22 u23] = [
p1 + p2 − p3
2
0
p2 + p3 − p1
2
]
• [u31 u32 u33] = [
p1 + p3 − p2
2
p2 + p3 − p1
2
0]
The three invests 0 on the other countries. Those without
a adversary relation invest all their total capacities as their
self-defense. Such a U is a balanced equilibrium, which is
also unique.
Theorem 3: (Balanced Equilibrium in Games with Com-
plete adversary Graph) In a power allocation game where
the adversary pairs make up a complete subgraph of E, the
game has a balanced equilibrium if and only if the necessary
total power condition in Theorem 2 holds for these countries.
Proof: The proof is by induction.
The Base Case: As proven in Lemma 3, a game where the
adversary relations make up a complete 3-country graph has
a balanced equilibrium if the total power condition holds for
them.
The Induction Hypothesis: a game where the adversary
relations make up a complete k-country graph has a balanced
equilibrium if the total power condition holds for them (k ∈
Z and k > 3).
The Induction Step: Prove that the theorem holds with
k + 1 countries using the assumption above.
Sort the capacities of the k+1 countries by a nonincreasing
order: p1 ≥ p2... ≥ pk+1. By the above assumption, the total
power condition holds.
Subtract p1 by pk+1 and pk+1 by pk+1. Resort the
capacities by a decreasing order: p¯1 ≥ p¯2... ≥ p¯k ≥ 0.
The total power condition holds for each of the k + 1
country. Before the change, p1 ≤ p2 + p3+ ...+ pk+1. After
the change, p1− pk+1 ≤ p2 + p3 + ...+ pk. The total power
condition still holds for p1.
Since p2 ≤ p1 and pk+1 ≤ pk, it can be proven that
p2 ≤ (p1−pk+1)+p3+ ...+pk. Then for p2, the total power
condition still holds. Similarly, the total power condition
holds for the rest of the countries.
By the induction hypothesis, a balanced equilibrium U
exists for the game, which has the above k countries with
capacities p¯1, p¯2, ..., and p¯k.
Now another balanced equilibrium, U¯ is obtained with the
following steps.
• Insert a new row after the k-th row and a new column
after the k-th column in U , which was originally a (n−
1)×(n−1) matrix after deleting the (k+1)-th country,
to restore it as a n × n matrix and to represent the
allocations by and towards country k + 1.
• Initialize the elements in the new row and new column
as 0.
• Then add back the subtracted power pk+1 by updating
u1,k+1 and uk+1,1 as pk+1.
By the construction lemma, U¯ is a balanced equilibrium.
Hence, any game where the adversary relations make up a
complete graph has a balanced equilibrium if and only if the
total power condition holds.
The below figure illustrates the induction step with a sim-
ple case — at the end of the process, a balanced equilibrium
for the original game is constructed.
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Theorem 5 discusses an alternative set of countries’ power
condition for balanced equilibrium to exist in environments
where the adversary pairs make up a bipartite graph, termed
as extended power condition. This kinds of graphs can also
be called structurally balanced graphs [5].
Moreover, this extended power condition takes a similar
form with the neighbor set condition in the Hall Maximum
Matching theorem in Theorem 5.
Theorem 4: (Hall’s Maximum Matching Theorem [8]) Let
G = (V , E) be a finite bipartite graph where V = L∪R with
L ∩R = ∅. G has a maximum matching if and only if that
for all subsets S ∈ L, we have |γ(S)| ≥ S| (γ(S) = {j ∈
R|(i, j) ∈ E for some i ∈ L}), and vice versa.
Theorem 5: (Balanced Equilibrium in Games on Struc-
turally Balanced Graph) A power allocation game on a struc-
turally balanced graph, in other words, in the environment
where the adversary pairs make up a bipartite graph, has
a balanced equilibrium if and only if the extended power
condition holds for the countries with adversaries:
• ∀S ⊆ L,
∑
j∈AS
pj ≥
∑
i∈S
pi
• ∀S ⊆ R,
∑
j∈AS
pj ≥
∑
i∈S
pi (AS =
⋃
i∈S
Ai)
By definition, the two sets of nodes, L and R, represent the
two groups of countries with adversaries relations, where
each country in either set is only connected to countries in
the other set. S is a subset of either set.
Theorem 6: (Equivalence between balanced equilibrium
on Bipartite adversary Graph and Max Flow) For a power
allocation game with a bipartite adversary graph E = {V , E}
of the left vertex set L and the right vertex set R, construct
a flow network E¯ which satisfies the following
• V¯ = V ∪{s, t}, with s being the source and t being the
sink.
• E¯ = {(s, i)|i ∈ L} ∪ {(i, j)|i ∈ L, j ∈ R} ∪ {(j, t)|j ∈
R}.
• Edge capacities1 in E¯ are: c¯(s, i) = pi if i ∈ L; c¯(j, t) =
pj if j ∈ R; c¯(i, j) = +∞ if i ∈ L and j ∈ R.
The problem of finding a balanced equilibrium in the
original game is equivalent to finding a max flow (min cut)
f¯ in E¯, which satisfies that f¯(s, i) = c¯(s, i) if i ∈ L and
f¯(j, t) = c¯(j, t) if j ∈ R.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
An obvious and important extension of this paper is to
the case where the antagonism in the networked international
environment makes up a k-partite graph. Realistically, this
can be regarded as a k-sided game where countries could be
friends with those from the same side and only be adversaries
with those from the other k− 1 sides. Moreover, the k-sided
game is actually a generalization of a commonly known k-
player game, which can expect to encompass a series of
scenarios in countries’ conflicts and cooperation of the real
world. A natural question to ask is that, in this kind of
environment, what kind of power condition for countries is
it in order to balanced equilibrium to exist?
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